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Improvement in secure transmission of information is an urgent practical need for governments,
corporations and individuals. Quantum key distribution [1, 2] (QKD) promises security based on
the laws of physics and has rapidly grown from proof-of-concept to robust demonstrations [3–6]
and even deployment of commercial systems [7–9]. Despite these advances, QKD has not been
widely adopted, and practical large-scale deployment will likely require integrated chip-based de-
vices for improved performance, miniaturisation and enhanced functionality, fully integrated into
classical communication networks. Here we report low error rate, GHz clocked QKD operation of
an InP transmitter chip and a SiOxNy receiver chip—monolithically integrated devices that use
state-of-the-art components and manufacturing processes from the telecom industry. We use the
reconfigurability of these devices to demonstrate three important QKD protocols—BB84, Coherent
One Way (COW) and Differential Phase Shift (DPS)—with performance comparable to state-of-the-
art. These devices, when combined with integrated single photon detectors, satisfy the requirements
at each of the levels of future QKD networks—from point-of-use through to backbones—and open
the way to operation in existing and emerging classical communication networks.
Delivery of the promise of QKD will require moving to
an integrated network, where, as with the classical com-
munication infrastructure, each level has particular re-
quirements that must be met. Use of QKD in hand-held
and field deployable devices, or to secure the ‘Internet
of Things’ for example, will require devices with a small
footprint and high robustness to environmental condi-
tions. ‘QKD-to-the-home’ will require moderate band-
width, low cost devices, and co-existence with emerg-
ing fibre-to-the-home transceivers. Backbones for QKD
metro and long-haul networks will require compatibility,
and in some cases direct integration, with photonic and
electronic semiconductor devices and systems. Also cru-
cial will be the capability to reconfigure QKD protocols
on the fly and overcome the bottlenecks currently limiting
long-range, high-speed key distribution. Use of common
devices will enable unification across all levels of the net-
work. Ultimately, a QKD network must be seamlessly in-
tegrated with the classical communication network with
the distinction between classical and quantum operation
ideally being defined in software not hardware.
While extreme levels of integration have been achieved
in the microelectronics industry over the past decades,
it is only recently that size, cost and power consump-
tion considerations have demanded higher levels of in-
tegration in photonics. Fibre-to-the-home, data centre,
and 100 Gbs−1 metro and long-haul network applica-
tions have driven the development of the InP platform
to the point of full integration of laser sources, ampli-
fiers, modulators and detectors [10]. Integrated photon-
ics [11] is thus poised to deliver major benefits to QKD
technology and networks [12–14] by allowing the minia-
turisation of components and circuits for hand-held and
field deployable devices. It also provides highly robust
manufacturing processes which help reduce cost for per-
sonal devices. Finally, the complexity achievable with
the integrated platform enables practical implementation
of mutli-protocol operation for flexility, multiplexing for
higher rates, and additional monitoring and certification
circuits to protect against side-channel attacks [1] in a
fibre network.
While there have been individual demonstrations of
time-bin decoding [16], miniaturisation [17], and recon-
figurability [4] in integrated devices; here we report QKD
operation of complex devices that meet the require-
ments outlined above. We used the InP platform to
implement a monolithically integrated transmitter (Fig-
ure 1a), consisting of a tunable laser, optical interfer-
ometers, electro-optic phase modulators and a PIN pho-
todiode. We implement a receiver (Figure 1b), consist-
ing of a photonic circuit with thermo-optic phase shifters
and reconfigurable delay line in the SiOxNy platform,
and off-chip single photon detectors. Both photonic sys-
tems were manufactured using state-of-the-art industrial
fabrication processes (Oclaro and LioniX, respectively)
and were designed for multi-protocol reconfigurable op-
eration. We show performance of the photonic devices
with clock rates up to 1.7 GHz, a quantum bit error rate
(QBER) as low as 0.88%, and estimated secret key rates
up to 568 kbs−1, for an emulated 20 km fibre link. To-
gether with the development of integrated single photon
detectors[18], these devices point the way to seamless in-
tegration with existing and emerging classical communi-
cation systems, including microelectronics.
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FIG. 1: Integrated photonic devices for quantum key distribution consisting of: (a) A monolithically integrated In-
dium Phosphide (InP) transmitter for GHz clock rate, reconfigurable, multi-protocol QKD. (b) A Silicon Oxynitride
(Triplex) photonic receiver circuit for reconfigurable, multi-protocol QKD that passively decodes the quantum in-
formation with off-chip single photon detectors. (c) The InP technology platform waveguide cross-section [10]. (d)
Wavelength tunable continuous-wave laser, formed from two tuneable Distributed Bragg Reflectors (T-DBR) and a
semiconductor optical amplifier (SOA). (e) Microscopic image of electro-optic phase modulators in Mach-Zehnder
interferometer. (f) The SiOxNy Triplex waveguide cross-section, with metalisation for heating elements [15]. (g)
Microscopic image of the receiver delay lines.
Figure 1 shows a schematic of the chip-to-chip QKD
system. For the transmitter device, the InP material sys-
tem was chosen to meet the requirements of fast active
electro-optics (with GHz operating speeds) and mono-
lithic integration with the laser source. For the receiver
device, the SiOxNy material system was chosen to min-
imise photon loss from fibre-to-chip coupling and waveg-
uide propagation loss, whilst maintaining a compact foot-
print. Both devices, along with fibre coupled single pho-
ton detectors, represent the full photonic QKD system.
The InP-based transmitter chip was fabricated using
an advanced active-passive integration technology [10],
where a multistep epitaxial growth process provides large
flexibility in the waveguide structure (see Figure 1(c)).
The on-chip tunable laser (Figure 1(d)) was formed from
two distributed Bragg reflectors (DBR) and a semicon-
ductor optical amplifier (SOA). When operated in contin-
uous wave (CW) the laser source exhibited single mode
behaviour with FWHM of 34 pm, a side-mode suppres-
sion ratio of >50 dB, and an operating wavelength of
1550 nm with ∼10 nm tuning range. Short electrical
pulses applied to the reverse biased electro-optic phase
modulator (EOPM) in the first MZI enabled optical pulse
generation with <150 ps duration and ∼30 dB extinc-
tion ratio. The exact timing between consecutive pulses
could be accurately controlled by the driving electronics
(see SI), and the on-chip photodiode was used to monitor
the laser intensity and provide feedback to stabilise the
laser current. The remaining electro-optic phase modu-
lators and MZIs were used to drive the different QKD
protocols and to attenuate the laser pulses to the single
photon level. Light was coupled out of the device using
a lensed optical fibre.
The SiOxNy receiver chip was fabricated using the
TripleX technology platform [15], where alternating lay-
ers of Si3N4 and SiO2 were deposited and etched to cre-
ate a hollow box structure to guide light in a high index-
contrast but low loss waveguides (∼0.5 dB/cm), and with
low coupling loss between chip and fibre (∼2 dB), yield-
ing a total loss ∼ 9dB for BB84 configuration. Metal
layers on top of the structure created thermo-optic phase
shifters for circuit reconfigurability. The first MZI acts
as a tunable beamsplitter (TBS) and taps off a portion
of the incoming signal, which was routed to a single pho-
ton detector and used primarily for the COW protocol.
The second MZI (L-BAL) acts to balance the losses in
the asymmetric MZI (AMZI), which incorporates a digi-
tally reconfigurable delay line, tunable from 0 to 2.1 ns in
steps of 300 ps. The thermo-optic phase shifter (TOPS)
within the AMZI was used calibrate the phase relation-
ship between the two arms of the interferometer. Light
was coupled out of the device and into external fibre
coupled superconducting nanowire single-photon detec-
tors mounted in a closed cycle refrigerator[19] which had
3an system detectorion efficiency of ∼45% from the fibre
input, a temporal jitter of ∼50 ps, and a dead-time of
∼10 ns.
The highly reconfigurable nature of the transmitter
and receiver devices allowed the implementation of a
number of different QKD protocols. Here, we specifically
investigated the three protocols of BB84, COW and DPS.
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FIG. 2: Transmitter output for the four BB84 states,
demonstrating the 136 ps FWHM pulses with near 30 dB
extinction, and temporal separation of 580 ps.
The BB84 [20] QKD protocol was implement using
time-bin encoding, where |0〉 was encoded by a photon in
the first time bin and |1〉 was encoded by a photon in the
second time bin, while |+〉 was encoded by a photon in a
superposition of the first and second time-bin with zero
relative phase, and |−〉 was encoded by a photon in a su-
perposition of being in the first and second time bin with
a pi relative phase, as illustrated in Figure 2. The BB84
protocol transmits one of two orthogonal states chosen
at random, encoded in one of two randomly chosen non-
orthogonal bases. We used the Z-basis {|0〉, |1〉} and the
X-basis {|+〉, |−〉}.
The CW laser source was modulated (P.MOD)
to select the time bin choice, which were then
phase randomised with a single electro-optic modulator
(PH.RAND) before being attenuated and intensity mod-
ulated (I.M). The intensity of the {|+〉, |−〉} states was
reduced by half, compared to the {|0〉, |1〉} states in order
to maintain the same average photon number per state.
The intensity modulator was also used to encode the de-
coy photon levels required to mitigate multi-photon con-
tamination for security [21]. The final MZI encoded the
relative phase between successive time bins to implement
the |−〉 state.
Within the receiver chip, the digitally tunable delay
line was reconfigured to match the 600ps time interval be-
tween time-bins from the transmitter device. The phase
decoding AMZI overlapped successive time-bins creating
three possible time-slots within which to detect photons.
Phase information interfered in the middle time-slot al-
lowing measurements in the {|+〉, |−〉} basis, whereas
time of arrival information in the first and third time-
slots measured in the {|0〉, |1〉} basis. This decoding al-
lows for a passive optical circuit, with the detection event
constituting the random basis choice, thus removing the
requirement for GHz rate active elements and quantum
random number generators in the receiver.
The COW protocol [22] transmits pulses in pairs, en-
coding |0〉 with the first bin and |1〉 with the second.
Again the pulse modulated CW laser was used to gener-
ate pulses in these time-bins. While the key was gener-
ated unambiguously from the time of arrival of the sin-
gle photon in a pair, security of the channel was deter-
mined by measuring the visibility from interfering suc-
cessive photon pulses. A decoy state, with photon pulses
in each time-bin (|0〉 and |1〉), was included to increase
the probability of occupied successive pulses, allowing a
more accurate measurement of interference. Using the
first MZI, the receiver routes a larger proportion of the
input signal to single photon detectors for key genera-
tion, and a smaller proportion to the AMZI for visibility
measurement.
Finally, the DPS protocol [23] encodes information
within the relative phase, 0 and pi, of a train of pho-
ton pulses generated from the temporally modulated
CW laser. The information was decoded unambiguously
through the AMZI by interfering successive pulses, pro-
viding a QBER based on the number of incorrect counts
at the wrong output of the phase decoding circuit. The
security of the channel was determined by bounding the
possible information an adversary could extract, that in
turn would cause errors in the transmitted information.
Each of the above three protocols was implemented
on the chip-to-chip system, where the length of optical
fibre link was emulated using a variable optical attenu-
ator to induce channel loss, where a loss of 0.2 dB/km
was assumed (standard within telecommunications fibres
at 1550 nm), although rates could be improved through
use of low loss fibres [24], and optimising the SNSPDs
for ultra low dark counts [25]. The effects of dispersion
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FIG. 3: Experimental results for (a) BB84, (b) COW, and (c) DPS showing the raw detection rate, estimated secret
key rate, and relevant QBER. For BB84 the QBER is derived from the timing and phase errors, while for COW
the QBER is derived from the timing error and security of the channel is estimated from phase coherence between
successive pulses, and finally for DPS the QBER is estimated based on the error from the phase encoded information.
State (or clock) rates of 560 MHz, 860 MHz, and 1.76 GHz were used for BB84, COW, and DPS respectively.
Protocol µ State QBER QBER Raw Secret
(per Rate Time Phase Rate Rate
pulse) (GHz) (%) (%) (Mbps) (kbps)
BB84 0.45 0.56 1.17 0.92 1.51 345
COW 0.28 0.86 1.37 1.36 2.67 311
DPS 0.28 1.76 - 0.88 2.78 565
TABLE I: Comparison of parameters and measured rates
for the three QKD protocols over an emulated fibre link
of 20 km, assuming 0.2 dB/km, using a digital variable
attenuator.
were considered negligible for the broad ∼150 ps pulses
used here. The performance of our integrated devices for
all three protocols is shown in Figure 3, where the raw
key rate, estimated secret key rate, and QBER observed
are plotted. For BB84, using an attenuation equal to
20 km of fibre we obtained an estimated secret key rate
of 345 kbits/s using a clock rate of 560 MHz; using av-
erage single photon numbers of 0.45, 0.1, and 5.0×10−4
for the signal and two decoy states chosen with probabil-
ities of 0.8, 0.15, and 0.05 respectively; and observed an
average QBER of 1.05%. The secret key rate for BB84
was calculated using the raw and sifted key rates, and
the measured QBER, using the security proof of Ma et
al.[21].
For COW, again using an attenuation equal to 20 km
of fibre we obtained an estimated secret key rate of
311 kbits/s using a clock rate of 0.86 GHz with a QBER
of 1.37% due to timing information and a QBER of 1.36%
due to the interferometer and security of the channel.
The secret key rate of COW was calculated using the
sifted key rate and measured visibilities according to the
security proof by Branciard et al.[26] shown to be a se-
cure upper bound for collective attacks.
For DPS at the same attenuation we obtained an es-
timated secret key rate of 565 kbits/s using a clock rate
of 1.76 GHz and measuring a QBER of 0.88%. The se-
cret key rate of DPS was calculated by measuring the key
errors and visibilities according to the security proof by
Branciard et al.[26] and is limited to collective attacks.
A summary of these results are presented in Table 1,
where in all cases we show a performance comparable
to the state-of-the-art in current fibre and bulk optical
systems[1]. This work demonstrates the feasibility of us-
ing fully integrated devices within QKD systems, imple-
menting three important protocols by utilising the re-
configurability of the devices. The integrated photonic
platform allowed us to demonstrate miniaturised devices
exploiting robust, low-cost manufacturing processes, that
allow flexibility in fibre network settings.
These devices could be readily adapted to implement
more protocols, such as the reference-frame indepen-
dent and measurement-device independent QKD proto-
cols [27, 28]. Also the tunablity of the laser source enables
flexibility in the wavelength of operation, this combined
with the complexity achievable with the platform will be
key to enabling high capacity wavelength division mul-
tiplexing schemes of the quantum channel in a practical
implementation. The increased complexity allowed by in-
tegrated photonics will facilitate the implementation of
further monitoring and certification circuits, protecting
against security flaws and side channel attacks[1] with
minimal change in footprint and cost.
Compatibility with current integrated photonic
telecommunication hardware will ultimately allow
seamless operation alongside classical communications
transceivers, enabling hybrid classical and quantum
communications devices. Moreover, the ability to scale
up these integrated circuits to 100’s or even 1000’s of
components [10] opens the way to new and advanced
integrated quantum communications technologies.
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